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Abstract: 
Political instability has the potential to disrupt financial markets. But how do political institutions affect 
financial movements in an environment where all institutions are in flux? This paper looks at the effects 
of formal and informal political volatility in the new EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the 
Eastern Neighborhood, and farther afield in Central Asia to answer this question. Using asymmetric 
GARCH modeling on monthly data, I find that informal political volatility has a significant negative effect 
on stock returns, while formal political institutions generate much higher financial volatility than 
changes in monetary policy.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The lingering economic effects of the global financial crisis and subsequent sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe have been compounded by an upswing in political volatility in the European Union (EU), 
especially in the new members of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Referenda, surprise election 
outcomes, and the fall of governments have been increasing in pace and frequency since 2007 but 
especially during the height of the crisis, making the political environment in many countries uncertain 
and increasing political risk (Figure 1). While the most visible effect of this volatility has been slowing 
large-scale initiatives for European integration, especially related to supranational solutions to the 
ongoing crisis, at the national level, such political volatility has fed into and reinforced macroeconomic 
instability. This instability has the potential to threaten economic gains made in transition economies 
over the previous two decades.  
 
Figure 1 – Average Political Risk in EU Accession and Neighborhood Countries, 2006-2012 
 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and author’s calculations. Lower numbers indicate higher political 
risk. 
 
This relationship between political instability and sub-optimal economic outcomes has been explored in 
recent papers such as Fatas and Mihov (2013) and Aisen and Veiga (2013), with empirical evidence 
showing consistently negative effects of political volatility on economic growth and investment: for 
example, Heinsz (2004) provides evidence for 172 countries that political volatility leads to policy 
volatility and dampened growth, while Gurgul and Lach (2013) show that government changes have a 
negative impact on growth in Central and Eastern Europe. Further extensions to this research have 
explored the effect of political volatility on other facets of the economy, including financial markets, 
with a large literature shows the effect of political changes on capital markets, either via the effect of 
political news on financial sector volatility (led by Engle and Ng [1993]) or the functioning of political 
institutions themselves. For example, Arin et al. (2013) traced the relevance of political variables for 
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financial volatility in OECD countries while Hartwell (2014a) examined the effect of democratic 
transitions on stock markets.   
 
The literature relating political instability to financial market outcomes has identified two interlinked but 
distinct channels through which political volatility can impact capital markets: first, via the direct 
exercise of monetary policy and how it is utilized; and second, via a more indirect channel of overall 
policy uncertainty that accompanies both regularly-scheduled elections and informal political instability. 
The first channel has been extensively studied, with a long and established literature linking monetary 
policy with both levels of asset returns (Thorbecke 1997) and volatility of returns (Bernanke and Gertler 
2012). The second channel has also seen some interesting work done, mainly relating the impact of 
government changes and political news on stock market volatility (Beaulieu et al. 2005).   
 
However, what happens when the whole institutional make-up of an economy is in flux? How do 
financial markets deal with an environment of uncertain monetary policy and political institutional 
volatility? This is precisely the situation that the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) have faced over the past 25 years, as they have been building modern 
capital markets at the same time they have been erecting market-supporting institutions (Beck and 
Levine 2008) or importing European institutions wholesale. In many ways, the imperative of creating 
new institutions to facilitate the market economy collided with the challenge of fostering capital 
markets to finance the transition; in particular, the necessary change of political institutions engendered 
the exact sort of instability that would negatively impact financial markets. Moreover, the result of the 
political changes in the CEE and FSU countries was not readily apparent, meaning that markets would be 
even more susceptible to volatility from politics. Would the latest change in party mean a return to a 
quasi-socialist past or had necessary institutional reforms been “locked-in?”    
 
The purpose of this paper is thus to explore these links between political volatility and capital market 
volatility in transition, including new EU members, pre-accession countries, and countries in the Eastern 
Neighborhood, controlling for policy changes and the effect of EU membership. The main hypothesis is 
that increased political institutional volatility will feed through directly to stock market volatility, 
independent of and regardless of what is occurring in the monetary policy channel. Indeed, in an 
environment of rapid institutional change, monetary policy should mean less for the stock market’s 
prospects than political institutional vacillations. While capturing the direct effects of political volatility 
may be difficult, through utilization of appropriate metrics we may be able to discern the channels in 
which volatility operates. 
 
This paper makes a unique contribution to the literature in two ways. First, this analysis builds on recent 
empirical work (Goodell and Vähämaa 2013, Hartwell 2014a) to examine the effects of political volatility 
on the financial markets of transition economies, but extending it to include the effects of integration 
with Europe. The EU itself may provide a buffer, with the prospect of EU accession somehow insulating 
countries against too-volatile swings. Secondly, this paper also has assembled, for the first time, a 
comprehensive dataset on monthly political changes across transition economies. While Hartwell 
(2014a, 2014b) examined the effects of volatility surrounding democratic transitions, this paper goes 
further in examining the broad spectrum of political volatility, both formal and informal.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
As noted above, there are two main channels through which political instability can affect stock market 
movements: the first is directly via monetary policies, which may change due to political ideology or 
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policy preferences. There is a large and established literature on the effects of monetary policy on stock 
market movements (Thorbecke 1997, Rigobon and Sack 2003), with Hsing and Hsieh (2012) showing 
that the growth of M2/GDP directly contributed to stock market volatility in Poland. Extending this 
literature to the drivers of the monetary policy volatility, we can see that there are proven links between 
the volatility of inflation and political volatility (Aisen and Vega 2008), with Cukierman et al. (1992) 
finding that fragile polities tend to rely more on seignorage as a way to overcome political obstacles for 
expansionary fiscal policies.  Moreover, political instability has been shown to be both a cause and an 
effect of monetary profligacy, due to the endogeneity of monetary policy institutions; as Carmignani et 
al. (2008) demonstrate, political instability can hamper central bank functioning (in particular its 
independence), and thus lead directly to higher inflationary outcomes.  This link was further extended 
by Papadamou et al. (2014) to show that central bank independence affects stock market volatility, thus 
closing the circle of causality from political instability to monetary institutions to financial volatility.  
 
The second, and perhaps more independent, channel in which political instability can influence the stock 
market is related to the uncertainty regarding broader economic policies that political volatility can 
engender. An enormous amount of scholarship has been dedicated to understanding the effect of 
“news” on financial markets (see Hayo and Kutan 2005); the underlying premise of these analyses is that 
policy uncertainty up until and after the moment of a political or economic announcement drives higher 
levels of volatility than in periods of no news. In the case of political institutions, however, the “news” 
that can occur is not just limited to one press release, but is related to a multi-year policy stance (in the 
case of elections) or the repercussions of informal and possibly recurring political instability (as in a 
terrorist attack) for the broader economy. These effects of policy uncertainty on financial markets, 
driven by underlying political volatility, can be magnified in countries where there is less experience with 
capital markets (Białkowski et al. 2008). In any case, as Low et al. (2011) show, political stability more 
broadly defined is an unmitigated positive for stock markets, as it removes investor concerns about 
policy uncertainty and lowers risk premia. On balance, markets do not like to be surprised, whether in 
the context of a single news briefing or in drastic changes in political institutions.  
 
While there is a broad theoretical basis relating political volatility to stock market volatility, in order to 
understand which specific political institutions may have a greater impact on financial markets we need 
to refer to the growth literature, where much more research has been done in examining the effect of 
separate political institutions on growth volatility. For example, Brunetti and Weder (1998) found that 
constitutional changes (their measure of volatility) negatively correlated with growth, while Svensson 
(1998) found that the probability of an imminent political change harmed property rights formation, 
which then in turn hampered investment. Berggren et al. (2011) find that instability in legal and policy 
institutions in rich countries actually contributes significantly to higher growth rates, while instability of 
social institutions is a drag on growth across all countries. However, Yang (2011) also finds that normal 
democratic processes tend to increase macroeconomic instability across the board, a finding echoed by 
Boutchkova et al. (2012), who conclude that the variance of a country’s major index return doubles 
during an election week.  
 
In contrast to the growth literature, there is comparatively less work done on specific political 
institutions and stock market volatility, with a focus almost exclusively on elections as the drivers of 
equity variance. Recent work from Białkowski et al. (2008) and Goodell and Vähämaa (2013), show the 
role of political uncertainty as encapsulated in elections tend to drive volatility around the event date. 
As Goodell and Vähämaa (2013:1116) note, the political uncertainty of an election “presumes that 
information regarding the probability of a particular election winner reflects information about future 
macroeconomic policy.” Thus, approaching elections engender market anxiety, leading to a revision and 
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continuous updating of expectations regarding future macroeconomic changes. Given the varying time-
horizons inherent in a capital market and the differing behaviors of its participants, this can thus lead to 
volatility within a stock market as allocations are changed and positions reversed. 
 
However, much like in the growth literature, there are differential effects of different types of political 
volatility. In particular, formal political changes such as an election may be anticipated well in advance, 
as well as being a one-off affair (unless there is scope for a run-off), so that volatility may settle quickly 
after an election (Santa-Clara and Valkanov 2003); moreover, the behavior of the party in power may be 
established fairly early on, or coalition talks concluded quickly, also contributing to a return to normalcy. 
Thus, these formal political channels may be supplemented by informal political volatility, including a 
host of variables. For example, external conflict or war in one’s neighborhood can have a direct impact 
on stock market returns, as shown in the Middle Eastern context by Fernandez (2007) regarding the Iraq 
War. Terrorism as well may have severe impacts on financial volatility (Essaddam and Karagianis 2014), 
as may other manifestations of internal conflict. Even political instability as milquetoast as an 
unexpected election result (Castells and Trillas 2013) or a senator switching parties (and thus control of 
government, see Jayachandran [2006]) can have major impact on financial market volatility in excess of 
normal. 
 
Finally, as noted in the introduction, the case of transition economies, where the entire institutional 
system is in a state of flux, may exhibit greater pass-through to financial volatility from political volatility 
than the oft-studied OECD countries. While Hartwell (2014a) found little relationship between 
democratic volatility (i.e. changes in the ability of individuals to influence the political process) and 
financial volatility, other types of informal instability may exert a stronger influence on burgeoning 
capital markets. Indeed, in places such as Russia where private organized crime once ruled but has now 
been overtaken by a predatory state (Gans-Morse 2012), the (legal) ability to enter the political system 
have little practical effect if your life is in danger. Thus, it may appear that informal political institutions, 
and their (in)stability, would have more of an impact than formal channels.  
 
 
III. Model and Empirical Strategy 
 
With the experience of concurrent EU accession and economic transition relatively unexplored from the 
standpoint of political institutional volatility, the purpose of this paper is to examine three main 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Increased political institutional volatility in transition economies fed through directly to stock market 
volatility 
 
Building on the extensive literature noted above, we should expect to see similar (if not more 
pronounced) effects in transition economies on financial markets from all types of political changes. In 
developed economies, strong institutions act as a buffer for bad news and political turmoil; no matter 
how bad things get in the political arena, the presence of strong institutions means a line beyond which 
policies cannot progress. And, given the semi-permanent nature of institutions, further moves that 
could shatter market confidence would require changing these institutions, a slower and longer-term 
process. However, Institutions in transition are inherently fragile, with nascent monetary institutions, 
incomplete macroeconomic stabilization, and property rights and other economic institutions just 
starting to be built. This reality means that the line in the sand has not yet been drawn. Political 
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instability in transition could just as easily wreck the system as save it, and thus I anticipate that political 
volatility in transition should translate into persistently volatile capital markets. 
 
H2: Informal political volatility should have a greater impact on stock markets in transition economies 
than formal political volatility.  
 
Formal political volatility such as elections should have a longer-lasting effect on stock markets in 
mature economies due to shifts in policy. In particular, worries about a change of party may show up in 
stock markets as a rational response to political change. Shifts in political winds may signal differential 
treatment of dividends, taxation, or other areas which may impact upon capital markets, thus making 
financial volatility a rational response. However, in transition economies, the relatively youthful nature 
of all institutions, as well as the reality that political institutions in some countries are Potemkin in 
nature (as in Belarus), may make formal volatility matter less for stock market performance. Similarly, 
the relatively regular nature of elections would also have less of an impact on firm and capital-market 
dynamics. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is derived from this reality, based on the assumption that informal political volatility would 
eventually manifest itself in formal political volatility. However, while responses to formal political 
volatility may be rational, a response to perceived changes in macroeconomic policy, informal political 
may be irrational, given that terrorism or external conflict have no such clear-cut link to capital market 
performance. But, as the manifestation of informal political volatility may both create short-term 
disruptions and longer-term uncertainty about future political changes, especially in an atmosphere of 
institutional fragility, we would expect to see informal volatility be the dominant factor in financial 
volatility in transition. 
 
H3: Increased political institutional volatility in transition economies fed through to stock market 
volatility, independent of the monetary policy channel 
 
Finally, while both formal and informal political volatility can have a direct influence on monetary policy 
(for example, Aisen and Veiga (2008) show political instability is associated with inflation volatility), it is 
plausible that political volatility in transition will also have a direct consequence on stock market 
volatility through expectations and policy effects (the rational response noted above). This effect should 
also be more pronounced in transition economies, given the relative fragility of their political institutions 
and capital markets vis a vis more advanced economies (Forestiere 2010), supplemented by the fact that 
the entire transition itself was a process of expectations augmentation. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, a basic model, without controls, relating financial volatility to 
institutional changes will be structured as follows: 
 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
Where yit is the change in the overall stock market index for each country, as measured by the (absolute 
value of the change in the) log of returns (as suggested by Nikkinen et al. 2008): 
 
(2) 𝑦𝑖𝑖 =   (∑ [log(𝑝𝑖𝑖) − log�𝑝𝑖𝑖−1�]𝑁𝑖=1 ∗ 100) 
 
Where p is the index at time t for country i less the price of the index at time t-1. The daily data is then 
summed over the month and averaged to give a mean return for that month. 
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The change in returns, and eventually financial market volatility, is determined in Equation 1, as noted 
above, by two major factors, monetary policy and political institutions, included as vectors here. To 
measure monetary policy, two metrics are utilized. The simplest is the period change in M2 (percent), to 
proxy for expansionary/contractionary monetary policy. Given the time that it may take for money 
changes to pass-through to price indices, using the magnitude and direction of the money supply makes 
sense as an immediate barometer of monetary policy, with the added benefit of complete data series 
for the countries included here. But this measure may miss the overall climate in which monetary policy 
occurs, and in particular if monetary policy is subjected to larger gyrations than over one period; such 
monetary policy volatility may have a much larger effect on financial volatility (as shown in Okoli 2012) 
due to difficulty in expectations formation. In order to capture the possibility of monetary policy 
volatility being the culprit for financial volatility, I utilize the rolling 3-month standard deviation of 
changes in M2. To alleviate simultaneity concerns, all independent variables are lagged one period. 
 
The political institutions variable shown in Equation 1 are various proxies for political instability, 
including both clear-cut signs of “informal” political instability (acts of terrorism, internal conflict) as well 
as more common “formal” instability (change of parliamentary government or formal elections). The full 
description of the political variables is shown in the Appendix.  
 
To capture the volatility aspect of financial markets in relation to political institutions, I utilize a GARCH 
specification to generate the volatility metrics (Table 1 shows that conditional heteroskedasticity is 
pervasive in our data, as encapsulated in the significant Box-Ljung Q-statistics and the Q-squared 
statistics). Moreover, given that we can anticipate asymmetric responses to political volatility, where 
negative political volatility has more pronounced and persistent effect on stock market volatility than 
positive political shocks, a variety of asymmetric GARCH specifications may be utilized; based on 
diagnostics, a GJR-GARCH (2,2) model of Glosten et al. (1993) outperforms other specifications such as 
(the admittedly more flexible) EGARCH by all conventional information criteria.1 In addition, where 
appropriate either student’s T or a generalized error distribution (GED) is used to capture the “fat tails” 
of the political institutional variables.  
 
Finally, the panel nature of our data recommends using a panel-GARCH framework rather than country-
by-country for a simple reason: given that transition was occurring simultaneously across a number of 
countries from the same region, panel GARCH helps us to capture cross-sectional dependence. As Lee 
(2010:143), correctly notes, panel-GARCH models “entail potential efficiency gains in estimating the 
conditional variance and covariance processes by incorporating relevant information about 
heterogeneity across economies as well as their interdependence.” 
 
The GJR-GARCH framework starts with a base model of: 
 
(3) 𝑦𝑖 =  𝜇 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
                                                          
1 A further benefit to the GJR-GARCH model is how EGARCH models the conditional variance. EGARCH places 
extra weight on more recent observations, making each shock that enters the system additive. However, in 
the case of institutional changes, which may amplify over time, the volatility shock is more likely to be 
multiplicative, a feature that the GJR-GARCH model captures (Duan 1997). 
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Where 𝜇 is the mean equation shown above as equation 1. The innovation in the GJR-GARCH model 
concerns the 𝜀𝑖 term, which contains the seeds of the asymmetric variance equation (and thus the 
modelling of financial volatility): 
 
(4) 𝜀𝑖 =  𝜎𝑖𝑧𝑖 
and 
(5) 𝜎𝑖2 = 𝜅 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝜎𝑖−𝑖 2 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝜀𝑖−𝑗2 +  ∑ 𝜉𝑗𝛽[𝜀𝑖−𝑗 < 0]𝜀𝑖−𝑗2𝑄𝑗=1𝑄𝑗=1𝑝𝑖=1  
 
Equation 5 represents the volatility of the returns variable, with the leverage coefficient in the GJR-
GARCH model is represented by I; as can be seen, the leverage coefficient is weighted towards negative 
shocks to capture the persistence of negative changes as distinctly asymmetric from positive shocks. 
Thus, I is equal to 1 if εt-j is less than 0, and 0 otherwise.  Moreover, in order to ensure stationarity, the 
GJR-GARCH model also imposes four constraints on equation 5: 
 
(6) 𝜅 > 0 
 
(7) 𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0,𝛼𝑗 ≥ 0 
 
(8) 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗  ≥ 0 
 
(9) ∑ 𝛾𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗 +  12∑ 𝜉𝑗𝛽 < 1𝑄𝑗=1𝑄𝑗=1𝑝𝑖=1  
 
For the dataset utilized here, given the auto-correlative nature of the data and based on a partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF) plot (not shown), an AR(n) term is also included, with n=4.2 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The dataset assembled for this exercise comes from a large variety of sources and covers 20 transition 
economies, both EU-accession and non-EU accession, monthly from 1989 to 2012.3 This frequency was 
chosen to deal with the reality of political institutional changes and capital markets: institutions are 
generally thought of semi-permanent creatures (Hartwell 2013), but in transition, institutional changes 
move at a higher speed, especially during the process of EU accession (as can be seen in the example of 
internal conflict, shown across countries in Figure 2). Thus, annual-level data misses the specific cause-
and-effect of institutional volatility. On the other hand, the structure of financial market data is 
predicated on high-frequency movements, and utilizing annual averages would not capture the true 
effects of political changes on capital markets. Instead, I split the difference between broader 
institutional changes (difficult to track on a daily basis) and stock market changes by examining monthly 
data.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
                                                          
2 GARCH was chosen over system-GMM as the high-frequency nature of the data, serial correlation, and its 
sheer size made GMM inappropriate. 
3 The countries included in the dataset are Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  
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Stock market returns were compiled for each country from Bloomberg and CEIC, while M2 and other 
macroeconomic variables from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database (or, where not 
available, from Eurostat or from the central banks of each economy). The informal political volatility 
variables were assembled from various sources, including the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
indicators for political stability. Other formal political indicators were manually coded based on 
information obtained via public sources such as newspapers, government and Ministry websites, and 
the Regan and Clark (2013) dataset. 
 
 
IV. Results and Analysis 
 
The results of the test of all hypotheses using the simple baseline model of Equation 1 are shown in 
Table 2, with financial volatility expressed as a function of political volatility.4  Table 2 shows the test of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 relating political volatility to financial volatility in the absence of controls: across all 
combinations of political variables, formal political institutional volatility, as proxied by either elections 
or prime ministerial/cabinet changes, had little effect on stock market returns but, in the case of 
elections, a strong demonstrable effect on financial volatility. Informal political volatility, on the other 
hand, had a much larger effect on stock market returns but only a marginally significant effect on 
volatility, with terrorism having the largest impact. In all specifications, monetary policy consistently 
both depresses stock market returns slightly while increasing financial volatility. Thus, both Hypothesis 1 
and 3 are confirmed, as formal political volatility did feed through to financial volatility, occurring 
independently of the monetary policy channel. Hypothesis 2, by contrast, is partially confirmed in this 
simple model, as informal volatility had a larger impact on stock returns than formal political institutions 
but a much smaller and less significant effect on financial volatility.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The explanation for these results may be found in the nature of the transition process itself. As noted 
above, transition entailed a change of several institutions simultaneously, with the change in political 
institutions meaning a power vacuum had also opened up. Given that political shifts could also 
determine the future of economic transition, and by extension financial markets, elections therefore 
were of much greater consequence in transition than in developed economies (especially since 
candidates who campaigned as communists were likely to govern as communists, see Hartwell 2013). 
While conflict could depress the market for a longer period, the run-up to elections, and the wait-and-
see period afterwards while new policies were announced, had far greater potential to rattle financial 
markets. Additionally, while formal political changes may have been foreseen, they also may have been 
accompanied by informal political volatility, such as violence against opposition leaders, riots, arrests, or 
even terrorism. Thus, an election may have expressed both formal and informal political volatility. 
 
However, given that these results are obtained using only institutional and monetary variables, there is a 
need to include controls which also could plausibly explain financial movements. Unfortunately, a full 
panoply of macroeconomic or market controls is not available monthly for many transition economies, a 
problem which leads us to a rather parsimonious control set. Specifically, three additional controls are 
included to proxy for economic environment. In the first instance, I include GDP growth as an indicator 
to capture the general economic direction of a country; as in Hartwell (2014a), this statistic is based on 
                                                          
4 ARCH, GARCH, and AR terms are all significant at the 1% level, but are not shown in the interest of space. The 
leverage effect of the GJR-GARCH model also shows that it is a more “correct” model of political volatility. 
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interpolated quarterly data and thus is a broader indicator of economic direction rather than necessarily 
capturing the exact state of an economy.5 Secondly, it is quite possible that internal financial volatility is 
occurring mostly independent of politics, and so to capture external financial volatility, I use both the 6-
month volatility (calculated as a rolling standard deviation) of gold prices and the month-to-month 
volatility of the S&P500 Index as a control. Finally, as noted above, perhaps monetary policy volatility 
drives financial volatility, and so rolling standard-deviations of monetary policy are also included. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The results of this specification are shown in Table 3. Each political volatility metric, both informal and 
formal, is paired with each other as well as with the two monetary policy volatility indicators and the 
two external volatility variables, resulting in a total of 12 models. Within each triumvirate of formal and 
informal political instability metrics, certain models appear to be a better fit for the data based on 
minimization of the AIC, with in particular models 1, 4, 9, and 10 appearing the be the more “correct” 
ones for understanding the relationship between financial volatility and political volatility.6  In these 
models (and indeed across other, less-well-fit ones), while cabinet and Prime Ministerial changes 
continue to be an insignificant driver of either stock returns or volatility (significant only when paired 
with monetary policy volatility), the presence of elections persistently results in higher levels of financial 
volatility. Similarly, internal tension and terrorism reduce stock returns in the aggregate, but have only a 
marginally significant effect (dependent upon the specification) on financial volatility.  
 
The picture painted by these results is a simple one, mainly that informal instability can harm overall 
returns in the short- and even the medium-term, but their effect is often priced in. Conversely, elections 
may be seen as a one-off event, thus having little effect on stock market returns, but the presence of an 
election and the policy uncertainty it brings may rattle financial markets. This is especially true in an 
environment such as a transition economy, where elections, even more so than elsewhere, have 
consequences. Thus, in terms of our hypotheses above, Hypotheses 1 and 3 regarding the effects of 
political volatility are confirmed, while Hypothesis 2 has been disproved, as informal volatility has little 
effect on financial volatility. 
 
 
The EU Factor 
Given the dispersion of countries in this dataset, perhaps stratifying the data into sub-samples would 
give more evidence on the impact of political volatility on financial markets. To this end, I include several 
ways in which to divide the dataset: in the first instance, I include a simple EU accession dummy, coded 
to 1 for all months for countries that eventually would become a member of the EU (even before their 
membership) and 0 for those that did not. This dummy captures several integration effects, including 
the multi-year nature of the EU accession process, which required phased-in institutional adjustments, 
as well as expectations in both political and financial markets on the permanence of such reforms. 
Integration with the EU would thus be expected to signal the import of financial stability for the long-
run, even if the short-run was still turbulent.  
                                                          
5 A helpful reviewer noted that there might be multicollinearity from GDP growth, as M2 is already included in 
the base model. However, given that we are using growth metrics (growth of GDP versus growth of M2) or 
volatility metrics (growth of GDP versus volatility of M2 growth), this is less of a theoretical problem. 
Econometrically, there is only a slight positive correlation between the two growth variables (0.22) over the 
full dataset, and even less correlation between GDP growth and the volatility of M2 growth (-0.16).  
6 In most cases, these models also have the best log likelihood results as well. 
11 
 
 
However, this simple EU dummy says little about how actual EU membership affected political and 
financial volatility. To that end, I also include a dummy coded as 1 for each month that a country was 
actually in the EU, starting with its formal accession date. We would expect to see this dummy have a 
larger effect on returns and perhaps on financial volatility, as expectations about a country’s 
performance would have actually passed into reality. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Building off the key models noted, Table 4 shows the results of including both of these EU dummies. 
Somewhat paradoxically, across the board, the dummy for actual EU membership correlates heavily 
with lower returns in the conditional mean, while overall EU accession status has little effect on returns. 
More importantly for our examination, countries which eventually attained EU accession appear to have 
either lowered (model 1, column 1) or wiped out entirely the effect of informal political volatility on 
returns (models 9 and 10). However, the inclusion of either EU dummy does not change the overall 
picture of volatility relationships, as elections continue to be a strong predictor of financial volatility 
even in EU countries; additionally, in model 9 (columns 5 and 6), the inclusion of EU dummies also 
makes the formal change of Prime Minister/cabinet a predictor of additional volatility. In all 
specifications, as above, informal volatility is a poor predictor of financial volatility, once again 
disproving Hypothesis 2.7 
 
As a last robustness test, this paper has touched upon deeper issues of institutional volatility, but 
advances in economic policy uncertainty (typified by Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016, hereafter BBD) 
make it possible for us to test if it is in fact institutional or policy uncertainty which is driving capital 
market volatility. Unfortunately, there are no direct suitable economic policy uncertainty indexes for the 
countries we examine here, so we are forced to rely on the “European” measure of BBD as a suitable 
proxy for continent-wide uncertainty (specifically, we utilize the change in the uncertainty index over 
the month). While not a perfect indicator for measuring country-specific policy uncertainty, this 
European variable does have the advantage of acting as a stand-in for specific country indexes for the 
countries who have acceded to the EU; i.e. a large portion of Polish economic policy uncertainty could 
be captured by the European index from 2004 onward.8 For other countries, further afield, the 
European index could capture global uncertainty or, more importantly, the uncertainty emanating from 
their largest trading partners.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 5. Across all specifications, the earlier results hold, with 
formal political instability having no effect on returns but informal institutional volatility have significant 
(and in many cases, stronger) negative effects. In regard to volatility, elections continue to be the largest 
generator of capital market volatility, while internal conflict and terrorism have an impact on financial 
volatility when paired with prime ministerial or cabinet changes; while the effects are marginally smaller 
economically, they are much stronger statistically.  Finally, to ensure that certain EU members are not 
biasing these results, I also include the narrower Germany policy uncertainty index, on the reality that 
emerging Europe’s relations were much stronger with Germany than with other members of the “old” 
                                                          
7 Additional robustness tests on the type of party in power are shown in the Appendix. 
8 Unfortunately, it is not possible to disentangle how much of Poland’s policy uncertainty is captured by the 
Europe variable and what remains at a home-grown level. 
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EU such as Spain or France. These results, shown in the odd-numbered columns of Table 7, do not 
change our core findings and, indeed, German uncertainty has far less of an effect on capital markets in 
transition than European uncertainty in general. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the effects of political volatility and monetary policy on financial volatility in 
the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and countries in the extended European 
neighborhood. Perhaps not surprisingly, monetary policy remains a major driver of financial volatility, 
albeit the effect is economically small. More importantly, the results above show that informal political 
institutions and their volatility were important as a determinants of financial market performance, with 
informal volatility contributing to far more depressed stock returns than in an environment of no 
volatility. On the other hand, formal political changes such as elections corresponded with much higher 
financial market volatility, even as they had no discernible effect on stock market returns.  In this sense, 
our conjecture that transition markets would behave differently from more-established ones was 
erroneous, as the effect of elections was much more pronounced than other manifestations of political 
volatility. Interestingly, EU membership appears to have lowered returns on average but acted as an 
anchor of stability to prevent informal volatility translating into financial volatility, suggesting that other 
institutional mechanisms are at play. 
 
Future work is called for to deal explicitly with the direct and indirect influence of political institutions on 
monetary institutions, and if either of these types of volatility influences the functioning of monetary 
policy in general. Such an examination would be crucial not only for new Member States of the EU or 
their neighbors further east, but would also be of interest within the Eurozone. Additionally, it would be 
helpful to understand better how informal political institutions interact with formal ones in transition: 
when does “informal” volatility suddenly become “formal?” As a corollary to this, there also may be 
other, better proxies for informal political volatility than the ones utilized here, which can better capture 
where this dividing line is. Econometrically, there may also be scope to utilize GARCH-MIDAS modelling 
in order to expand the control set of this paper (Alper et al. 2012), incorporating lower frequency 
variables as explanators for higher-frequency changes; such an approach may also capture more 
volatility dynamics at the daily level which may have been vitiated by monthly aggregation. All of these 
issues may occupy researchers for years, and this paper has only begun to point the way to new and 
exciting avenues of research in relating political institutions to capital markets. 
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Figure 2 – Internal Conflict Variable, by country 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
 
 n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis LM-Statistic 
Box-Ljung Q 
Statistic Q-Squared ADF Test 
Volatility (Dependent) Variables 
Log of Absolute Returns 2715 -7.34 1.173 0.607*** 1.392*** 194.11*** 5682.37*** 5851.63*** -16.459*** 
Policy and Institutional Variables 
M2 Period Change 3225 1.5252 3.9757 -2.134*** 171.41***  7.4967*** 834.32*** 100.32*** -26.96*** 
M2 3-month standard 
deviation 3182 197.83 116.011 0.3260*** -0.4401*** 82.049*** 1383.91*** 1210.13*** -10.186*** 
GDP Growth 2852 0.012 0.03885 0.692*** 9.175*** 1199.2*** 1731.03*** 3828.23*** -26.01*** 
Elections 3881 0.02 0.143 6.6038*** 41.610*** 0.479 34.10 34.10 -1.07*** 
Prime Minister/Cabinet 
Change 3881 0.05 0.21 5.135*** 24.369*** 0.88 58.72 58.72 -1.12*** 
Internal Conflict 3598 10.527 1.1795 -1.2387*** 2.6724*** 8931.1*** 69108.1*** 72853.6*** -0.02*** 
Terrorism 2301 3.4594 0.62469 -1.5416*** 2.426*** 5947.8*** 62251.7*** 60240.7*** -0.02*** 
EU Accession 3881 0.6485 0.4774 -0.6222*** -1.6128*** 671.08*** 18852.7*** 18852.7*** -1.76*** 
EU Accession timing 3881 0.2489 0.4324 1.1615*** -0.6510* 941.10*** 17854.1*** 17854.1*** -4.51*** 
Left-wing 3881 0.3870 0.4871 0.4640*** -1.785*** 654.33*** 16151.6*** 16151.6*** -6.04*** 
Note: significance of p-values of tests are shown, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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Table 2 – GARCH Regressions, Political Volatility v. Financial Volatility 
  1 2 3 4 
Conditional Mean Equation 
FORMAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
Elections -0.07   -0.05   
  1.18   0.74   
Prime Minister/Cabinet Changes   0.04   0.01 
    1.01   0.07 
INFORMAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
Internal Conflict -0.06 -0.06     
  7.44*** 5.62***     
Terrorism     -0.13 -0.14 
      8.89*** 7.85*** 
POLICY/INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
M2 Change -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  3.15*** 3.28*** 2.98*** 2.77*** 
C -1.81 -0.18 -2.06 -2.04 
  19.47*** 15.60*** 41.98*** 28.91*** 
Conditional Variance Equation 
Elections 2.06   2.41   
  3.57***   4.05***   
Prime Minister/Cabinet Changes   0.93   0.59 
    1.25   0.61 
Internal Conflict 0.09 0.09     
  1.66* 1.61     
Terrorism     0.21 0.19 
      2.03** 1.88* 
M2 Change 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  3.34*** 2.92*** 3.90*** 2.27** 
n 2434 2434 1889 1889 
Log Likelihood -1369.859 -1398.73 -1058.918 -1073.84 
AIC  1.1634 1.1649 1.1413 1.1549 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are shown, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and 
*** at 1%. 
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Table 3 – GJR-GARCH Results, Full Control Set 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Conditional Mean Equation 
FORMAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
Elections -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07             
  1.11 0.79 1.06 1.15 0.61 1.13             
Prime 
Minister/Cabinet 
Changes 
            0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
              1.12 1.02 0.93 0.61 0.85 0.36 
Internal Conflict -0.09 -0.09 -0.080       -0.09 -0.09 -0.08       
  3.81*** 2.23** 4.17***       3.40*** 3.82*** 3.70***       
Terrorism       -0.17 -0.16 -0.17       -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 
        4.08*** 4.59*** 3.99***       3.94*** 3.33*** 3.89*** 
M2 Change -0.0001 -0.0001   -0.0001 -0.0001   -0.0001 -0.0001   -0.0001 -0.0001   
  2.32** 2.88***   2.17** 2.84***   2.26** 2.88***   2.02** 2.67***   
M2 3-month Volatility     0.00004     0.00003     0.00004     0.00003 
      0.42     0.30     0.48     0.27 
C -1.68 -1.51 -1.75 -2.03 -1.99 -2.07 -1.70 1.53 -1.78 -2.03 1.99 -2.09 
  6.99*** 3.41*** 8.22*** 13.58*** 7.95*** 13.67*** 6.39*** 5.97*** 7.60*** 13.02*** 11.63*** 14.02*** 
Conditional Variance Equation 
Elections 2.22 2.07 1.97 2.19 2.16 1.89             
  4.59*** 3.39*** 3.09*** 3.98*** 3.38*** 2.77***             
Prime 
Minister/Cabinet 
Changes 
            1.25 0.89 1.56 0.80 0.38 1.11 
              1.61 1.01 2.36* 0.81 0.33 1.82* 
Internal Conflict 0.12 0.10 0.10       0.13 0.15 0.07       
  1.92* 1.50 1.21       1.78* 1.67* 0.97       
Terrorism       0.22 0.18 0.15       0.22 0.23 0.08 
        1.98* 1.60 1.17       1.85* 1.92* 0.76 
M2 Change 0.002 0.002   0.0020 0.00   0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001   
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  2.23** 2.89***   2.48** 2.90***   1.81* 0.97   1.90* 1.21   
M2 3-month Volatility     0.003     0.002     0.004     0.004 
      1.50     1.46     2.20*     2.88*** 
    0.69     0.36     1.65*     0.59   
n 2187 2187 2181 1756 1756 1752 2187 2187 2181 1756 1756 1752 
Log Likelihood -1017.05 -1184.25 -1016.0 -800.27 -950.61 -801.03 -1019.21 -1185.69 -1016.40 -803.43 -952.68 -805.81 
AIC 0.9511 1.1040 0.9528 0.9377 1.1089 0.9407 0.9531 1.1053 0.95 0.951 1.111 0.946 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are shown, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Full complement of controls 
included but removed for reasons of space (see Appendix). 
 
  
21 
 
Table 4 – Robustness Tests 
 Model 1 Model 4 Model 9 Model 10 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Conditional Mean Equation 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
Elections -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08         
  1.13 1.16 1.18 1.21         
Prime Minister/Cabinet Changes         0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
          0.84 0.88 0.58 0.52 
Internal Conflict -0.04 -0.08     -0.04 -0.08     
  1.80* 4.05***     1.55 3.67***     
Terrorism     -0.06 -0.15     -0.06 -0.16 
      2.92*** 3.63***     1.16 3.62*** 
M2 Change -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001     -0.0001 -0.0001 
  2.57*** 2.51** 2.50** 2.23**     2.30** 2.13** 
M2 3-month Volatility         0.00003 0.00003     
          0.32 0.36     
EU Accession Country -0.41   -0.38   -0.39   -0.39   
  4.19***   5.49***   4.07***   4.23***   
EU Accession Timing   -0.16   -0.09   -0.16   -0.10 
    2.68***   1.62   2.74***   1.75* 
C -1.79 -1.63 2.09 2.04 -1.90 -1.73 -2.11 -2.04 
  8.23*** 7.36*** 31.74*** 13.91*** 8.19*** 7.43*** 15.36*** 13.96*** 
Conditional Variance Equation 
Elections 2.20 2.11 2.25 2.23         
  4.30*** 4.01*** 4.12*** 4.00***         
Prime Minister/Cabinet Changes         1.46 1.48 0.78 0.72 
          2.10** 2.27** 0.85 0.73 
Internal Conflict 0.02 0.12     0.06 0.07     
  0.15 1.82*     0.52 0.86     
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 Model 1 Model 4 Model 9 Model 10 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Terrorism     0.01 0.13     0.08 0.15 
      0.03 1.06     0.48 1.24 
M2 Change 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002     0.002 0.002 
  2.67*** 2.75*** 2.87*** 2.99***     2.09** 2.36** 
M2 3-month Volatility         0.004 0.004     
          1.70* 2.37*     
EU Accession Country 0.67   0.67   0.17   0.44   
  1.44   1.58   0.43   1.01   
EU Accession Timing   0.31   0.43   0.22   0.39 
    1.77*   1.77*   1.19   1.55 
n 2187 2187 1756 1756 2181 2181 1756 1756 
Log Likelihood -1004.38 -1011.49 -790.59 -797.09 -1005.90 -1011.38 -793.88 -800.43 
AIC  0.9414 0.9479 0.9289 0.9363 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are shown, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Full complement of controls 
shown in Appendix. 
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Table 5 – Regressions including Economic Policy Uncertainty 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Conditional Mean Equation 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
Elections -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07         
  0.95 1.02 1.27 1.08         
Prime Minister/Cabinet Changes         0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
          1.13 1.10 0.66 0.67 
Internal Conflict -0.09 -0.09     -0.09 -0.08     
  4.06*** 4.15***     4.12*** 4.02***     
Terrorism     -0.14 -0.14     -0.14 -0.14 
      3.26*** 3.34***     2.97*** 3.10*** 
M2 Change -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  2.53*** 2.72*** 2.39** 2.63*** 2.50** 2.62*** 2.26** 2.36** 
European Policy Uncertainty 0.0004   0.0003   0.0004   0.0003   
  1.71*   1.43   1.73*   1.48   
German Policy Uncertainty   0.0001   0.0001   0.001   0.001 
    0.82   0.80   0.58   0.97 
C -1.59 -1.57 -2.07 -2.06 -1.61 -1.63 -2.09 -2.09 
  7.05*** 6.94*** 14.36*** 14.13*** 7.32*** 7.36*** 13.41*** 14.03*** 
Conditional Variance Equation 
Elections 1.75 2.04 2.42 2.21         
  2.38** 2.96*** 3.68*** 2.92***         
Prime Minister/Cabinet Changes         0.82 0.73 0.92 1.09 
          0.75 0.61 1.24 1.54 
Internal Conflict 0.11 0.10     0.20 0.11     
  1.44 1.38     2.20** 1.41     
Terrorism     0.11 0.12     0.31 0.29 
      0.80 0.86     2.37** 2.27** 
M2 Change 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
24 
 
  2.45** 2.32* 3.02*** 2.46** 0.70 2.77*** 1.09 0.77 
European Policy Uncertainty 0.02   -0.01   0.02   0.02   
  2.61***   0.89   3.91***   3.28***   
German Policy Uncertainty   0.004   0.001   0.01   0.008 
    0.47   0.33   0.51   2.33*** 
n 2272 2272 1841 1841 2272 2272 1841 1841 
Log Likelihood -1094.89 -1096.54 -884.438 -883.02 -1095.26 -1100.55 -888.91 -891.47 
AIC 0.9876 0.9890 0.9902 0.9886 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 
Distribution Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T Student's T GED GED GED 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are shown, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Full 
complement of controls shown in Appendix. 
